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6SHQJOHU¶V3UXVVLDQ6RFLDOLVP 
Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) was one of the most significant thinkers of the Weimar Republic, 
*HUPDQ\¶VILUVWGHPRFUDF\+LVZRUNQRWDEO\WKHWZR-volume, 1,200-page Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes (Decline of the West, 1918/22), had a profound influence on intellectual discourse 
in Germany and beyond.1 Yet despite the esteem in which he was held by his contemporaries, his 
thought has been seriously under-researched. In English, only four major studies have appeared 
in the last 70 years.2 This is all the more surprising in that the historical period in which he wrote 
has been extensively covered by both English- and German-language scholars and that some of 
the thinkers who drew critically on his ideas, such as Heidegger and Adorno, have become 
household names in Germany intellectual history. 
The English-language studies of Spengler have either been biographical, or they have 
focused narrowly on Decline of the West. Accordingly, in popular consciousness Spengler has 
earned the moniker of thH ³SURSKHWRIGHFOLQH´3 and has become synonymous with notions of 
crisis and disintegration, doom and gloom.   
 However, as the recent revival of interest in Spengler in German secondary literature has 
UHFRJQLVHGHYHQDFXUVRU\ ORRNDW6SHQJOHU¶VFRSLRXVZULWLQJVmakes it clear how much more 
there is to Spengler than this sole work.4 Moreover, the very titles of some of SpeQJOHU¶VODUJHO\
                                                          
1
 Cf. Zaur Gasimov and Carl Antonius Lemke Duque (eds.), Oswald Spengler als europäisches Phänomen. Der 
Transfer der Kultur- und Geschichtsmorphologie im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919-1939 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013). 
2
 H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler: A Critical Estimate (New York: Scribner, 1952); John F. Felleny, Twilight of 
the Evening Lands: Oswald Spengler ± a Half Century Later (New York: Brookdale, 1972); Klaus P. Fischer, 
History and Prophecy: Oswald Spengler and the Decline of the West (New York: Peter Lang, 1989); John 
Farrenkopf, Prophet of Decline: Spengler on World History and Politics (Louisiana: Louisiana State University 
Press, 2001).  
3
 The title of perhaps the best-known study of Spengler in English (cf. John Farrenkopf, Prophet of Decline). 
4
 The following recent studies are worth mentioning: Mohler, Armin and Karlheinz Weissmann, Die konservative 
Revolution in Deutschland 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch (Graz: Ares, 2005); Sebastian Maaß, Oswald Spengler. Eine 
politische Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2013); Martin Falck (ed.), Zyklen und Cäsaren. Mosaiksteine 
einer Philosophie des Schicksals. Reden und Schriften Oswald Spenglers (Kiel: Regin, 2013); Zaur Gasimov and 
Carl Antonius Lemke Duque (eds.), Oswald Spengler als europäisches Phänomen. 
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ignored writings, such as Die Revolution ist nicht zu Ende and Neubau des deutschen Reiches 
(The Revolution is not Over and Building the German Empire Anew, both 1924), indicate that his 
work actually contained positive proposals for the course of society and calls to political action. 
Accordingly, it is important to place 6SHQJOHU¶V WKRXJKW ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI UHFHQW
developments in Weimar historiography, which highlight the need to distinguish between crisis 
as a social condition and the evocation of crisis as a rhetorical device ± as a way to disqualify the 
status quo and prepare the ground for something new.5 
Spengler particularly foregrounds the struggle for a different social order in his 
overlooked pamphlet, Preußentum und Sozialismus (Prussianism and Socialism, 1919). The 
pamphlet serves as both a warning and an invocation: unless the German nation can come 
together as it purportedly did in the spirit of civil peace in the war effort of 1914, unless a 
genuine organic community [Gemeinschaft], beyond class and individualism, can be created in 
line with what Spengler deems the Prussian socialist spirit, then the German people will, he 
argues, be brought to its knees by the rule of ³(QJOLVK´banks, profiteering and speculation. 
The rallying cry for this Prussian socialism was heard across the political spectrum. For 
the conservative Ernst Jünger, the pamphlet forged ³WKH ILUVW ZHDSRQV >«@ IROORZLQJ WKH
GLVDUPDPHQWRI*HUPDQ\´6 and provided a springboard for the Conservative Revolution ± the 
anti-democratic and anti-Communist political movement of the 1920s in which Jünger was also 
active. )ROORZLQJWKHSDPSKOHW¶VSXEOLFDWLRQSpengler even became NQRZQDV³the Karl Marx of 
the bRXUJHRLVLH´7 The pamphlet was also absorbed by left-wing circles. Gustav Noske, the 
OHDGLQJ VRFLDO GHPRFUDW DQG:HLPDU¶V ILUVW 'HIHQFH0LQLVWHU acknowledged that ³6SHQJOHU¶V
                                                          
5
 Cf. Rüdinger Graf, Die Zukunft der Weimarer Republik. Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 1918-
1933 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008), pp. 104-111. 
6
 Cf. Detlef Felken, Oswald Spengler. Konservativer Denker zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur (Munich: Beck, 
1988), p. 114. 
7
 Ibid., p. 111. 
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3UXVVLDQVRFLDOLVP´ ran in his blood8 DVKHPRELOLVHGPLOLWDU\IRUFHVWRFUXVKWKHZRUNHUV¶DQG
VROGLHUV¶FRXQFLOs across Germany. 
Prussianism and Socialism was thus influential on both the left and the right. Yet how did 
it address the need for a German national resurgence? Through an analysis of the pamphlet, this 
essay will counter the dominant image of Spengler as a doomsayer with a despairing outlook by 
making the case that Spengler viewed the decline of Western society, for which he is accounting, 
not as an inexorable and irresistible process of disintegration, but as an open-ended development 
replete with both possibilities and pitfalls, depending on the concrete development of events at 
the time and the choices made by human agents. Further, this essay will argue that Spengler is no 
arch-conservative cultural critic lamenting the end of the white, Western European man¶V
influence on world history from an introspective and even racist perspective. Rather, 
Prussianism and Socialism should be viewed as a political intervention on the part of a thinker 
who poses challenging questions which remain relevant to twenty-first century life: not least 
because he draws on various liberal, socialist and nationalist discourses of modernity in order to 
develop his outlook. 
The essay will also EULQJ RXW WKH VSHFLILFLW\ RI 6SHQJOHU¶s ideas and the distinctive 
position he occupies as a thinker of the Conservative Revolution in two ways. First, it will 
discuss some of the references to socialist thinkers in Prussianism and Socialism, such as the 
founding father of German socialism, Ferdinand Lassalle, the left-syndicalist Robert Michels and 
the German social-democratic deputy Paul Lensch. These references have hitherto received scant 
attention in the few German-language discussions of the pamphlet.9 Second, it will explore the 
                                                          
8
 Ibid., p. 94. 
9
 As far as I can gather, the important reference to Lassalle in Prussianism and Socialism has been completely 
RYHUORRNHGLQVHFRQGDU\OLWHUDWXUH2QO\$GRUQRKDVGLVFXVVHGDOEHLWEULHIO\0LFKHOV¶VLQIOXHQFHRQ6SHQJOHUFI
$GRUQRµ6SHQJOHUQDFKGHP8QWHUJDQJ¶S5ROI3HWHU6LHIHUOHMXVWLILDEO\GHYRWHVtwo of his five biographical 
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HSLVWHPRORJLFDOURRWVRI6SHQJOHU¶VVRFLDOLVPDQGits links with his overall world view which, as 
we shall see, was based on a morphological, longue durée conception of human history as a 
cyclical, organically unfolding process.  
Following a brief contextualisation and overview of Prussianism and Socialism, this 
essay will DVVHVV IRXU DVSHFWV RI 6SHQJOHU¶V DUJXPHQW  how socialism fits into his view of 
historical change; how he views the relation between determinism and agency; how he 
understands political democracy; and how he weaves various socialist thinkers into his argument 
and what this incorporation reveals about his Prussian socialist project. In order to shed light on 
6SHQJOHU¶V PRWLYDWLRQV LQ SHQQLQJ Prussianism and Socialism, let us first turn to the socio-
political context in which it was written.  
 
Bavarian Disgust 
Spengler had been engaged with the material for Prussianism and Socialism since 1913, initially 
digging it up again in September 1918 in the hope of publishing it under the title Römer und 
Preußen (Romans and Prussians).10 As we shall see, this title alludes to one of the ideological 
cornerstones of the pamphlet ± the duty of the Prussians to establish a global hegemonic power 
along the lines of Rome (the Imperium Germanicum). 
The immediate backdrop to the pamphlet was 6SHQJOHU¶V³GLVJXVW´DW WKH³DQDUFKLVWLFDO
UDGLFDO µPRE¶´ GXULQJ WKH UHYROXWLRQ RI1RYHPEHU  DQG WKH SURFODPDWLRQ RI WKH VRFLDOLVW
                                                                                                                                                                                           
sketches of figures from the Conservative Revolution to Spengler and Lensch (cf. Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die 
konservative Revolution. Fünf biographische Skizzen (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1995) but the possible cross-fertilisation of 
their ideas has not been investigated. Spengler also cultivated personal friendships with figures on the right wing of 
social democracy, such as the trade-XQLRQ OHDGHU $XJXVW :LQQLQJ ZKR ZDV LQVSLUHG E\ /HQVFK¶V LGHDV *LYHQ
6SHQJOHU¶V SHUVRQDO DQG LQWHOOHFWXDO FRQQHFWLRQVZLWK*HUPDQ VRcial democracy, the largest political party of his 
time, these links demand further research. 
10
 Felken, Oswald Spengler, p. 95.  
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republic in his native Bavaria in January 1919.11 The revolutionary skirmishes landed on his very 
own doorstep, with the artillery fire in his resident Agnesstraße only ceasing on 4 May 1919. On 
21 February 1919, one day after the assassination of the socialist leader Kurt Eisner, Spengler 
met with his friend August Albers, editor of the newly-established publishing house, C. H.  
Beck.12 Spengler wanted to discuss publishing a text which would allow him to popularise his 
conviction that the liberal parliamentarism of Weimar would spell disaster for Germany if she 
wanted to re-emerge as a power on the world stage. As he puts it in Prussianism and Socialism, 
SDUOLDPHQWDULVPLQ*HUPDQ\ LVHLWKHU³nonsense or betrayal´13 Felken notes that Spengler had 
consciously avoided any discussion of politics in the first volume of his Decline of the West, 
leaving this to the forthcoming second volume. <HW6SHQJOHU¶VKDQGZDVIRUFHGE\WKHVSHHGRI
events. On occasion, certain sections of the pamphlet therefore read like a topical paraphrase and 
popularisation of Decline of the West.  
Spengler¶V GHFLVLRQ WR PRGLI\ WKH WLWOH to Prussianism and Socialism, presumably in 
consultation with Albers, can be explained with reference to the revolutionary events of 
November 1918, with socialist terminology reflecting the spirit of the age, in which Germany 
was governed by an all-socialist provisional government made up of three representatives from 
the two largest parties of the time: the Majority Social Democrats (SPD) and the Independents 
(USPD).  
 For Spengler, socialism was ³QRW WKHPRVW SURIRXQG EXW WKH QRLVLHVW TXHVWLRQ RI WKH
WLPH´.14 This quote summarises his core thesis that the noisy debates around socialism and 
                                                          
11
 Letter to Hans Klöres, 27 December 1918, cited in Arthur Helps (ed.), Spengler Letters: 1913-1936 (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 71. 
12
 Jürgen Naeher, Oswald Spengler (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994) p. 84. 
13
 Oswald Spengler, Preußentum und Sozialismus (Munich: Beck, 1920), p. 54. All subsequent references to this text 
will be placed in parentheses in the main text. 
14
 Spengler, Politische Schriften, p. 15. 
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capitalism on the streets and assemblies of early Weimar were in fact a faint echo of a more 
profound antagonism: the struggle between the Prussians and the English in what he deems the 
³wLQWHU´ RI:HVWHUQ RU )DXVWLDQ FLYLOLVDWLRQ %HIRUH DVVHVVLQJZKDW 6SHQJOHU meant by such 
concepts, let us first take a closer look at the pamphlet and its structure.   
 
Common Enemies  
Prussianism and Socialism runs a fine line, reflecting 6SHQJOHU¶VDGYHQWXULVWSROLWLFDOJDPEOH in 
propounding a socialist politics defined by opposition to the common enemies of the working 
class and the aristocracy: Marxism and liberalism. For Spengler, eradicating the baleful influence 
of both is a necessary condition for the revitalisation of Germany following military defeat in 
World War I. Such a German renaissance necessitates the unification of what Spengler deems 
the two socialist parties in Germany: not, as desired by many, of the SPD and the USPD, but of 
social democracy as a whole and the Conservatives. The German elite has to recognise that it 
PXVW RYHUFRPH ³HYHU\ WUDFH´ RI WKH ³IHXGDO-DJUDULDQ QDUURZQHVV´ZKLFK EHORQJs to an earlier 
phase of Western history.15 Equally, it has to reject the values of liberalism and its attempts to 
plant parliamentarism in alien Prussian soil, where it would not, and could not, grow. In turn, the 
German working class RUDWOHDVWWKH³UHVSHFWDEOH´ section of it)16 needs to break with Marxism, 
which, like liberalism, is an alien and corrosive ideology. It is necessary, so Spengler, to 
³OLEHUDWH´*HUPDQVRFLDOLVP from Marxism.17 The central aim of the pamphlet, therefore, is to 
lay bare the English roots of both Marxism and liberalism and to conduct a struggle against the 
                                                          
15
 Letter to Hans Klöres, 27 December 1918, cited in Arthur Helps (ed.), Spengler Letters: 1913-1936 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 71.  
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Spengler, Politische Schriften (Leipzig: Manuscriptum, 2009), p. 16. 
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insidious forces championing them within Germany, referred to by Spengler as the ³LQYLVLEOH
(QJOLVKDUP\ZKLFK1DSROHRQKDGOHIWEHKLQGRQ*HUPDQVRLODIWHUWKH%DWWOHRI-HQD´ (p. 7). 
 Spengler outlines his argument in four main chapters, each of which is further divided 
into numbered sections. The first chapter is entitled ³The Revolution´ (sections 1-7); it is 
followed by ³Sozialismus as a Way of Life´ (8-9); ³Englishmen and Prussians´ (10-18); ³Marx´ 
(19-21); and finally ³The International´ (22-24). 
  In the first section, Spengler emphasises that ³the revolution´ he has in mind begins not 
in 1918, but with the German war effort in 1914, with the country purportedly coming together 
in a heroic attempt to fight for the national interest. This narrative reflects a guiding trope of the 
Conservative Revolution, with Spengler echoing the stab-in-the-back myth [Dolchstoßlegende] 
popularised by the Prussian general Paul von Hindenburg. According to this view, the German 
army was on the brink of victory, only to be stabbed in the back by leftists and liberals on the 
home front. Indeed, for Prussianism and Socialism, the so-called German revolution of 1918 
(³the most senseless act´ LQ*HUPDQ history (p. 9)) is a sheer betrayal of the true civil-peace 
revolution of 1914, which DVVXPHG³legitimate and military forms´SThis betrayal of the 
German cause came in two acts: the June 1917 peace resolution agreed in the Reichstag and the 
abdication of the Kaiser in November 1918. Both represented desertion of military duty and a 
capitulation to England. 
Spengler then proceeds to discuss ³Socialism as a Way of Life´, which describes 
Prussian socialism as ingrained in the instinct and consciousness of the Prussians, who form a 
³UDFH LQ WKH VSLULWXDO VHQVH´ (p. 22). A brief aside is necessary here, not least because of the 
controversy surrounding Spengler and racial theory in the context of the horror that would later 
be unleashed on Germany: KRZHYHUPXFK6SHQJOHU¶V3UXVVLDQVDQG(QJODQGHUVPD\EHEDVHGRQ
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caricatures or stereotypes, they are not biologically determined, but metaphysical categories, 
which are supposed to reflect the soul of certain peoples and epochs. This emphasis on the soul 
DQG OLYLQJ RXW RQH¶V GHVWLQ\ LV LQWHJUDO WR WKH*HUPDQ WUDGLWLRQ RI philosophy of life in which 
Spengler stands. Indeed, on several occasions, Prussianism and Socialism highlights how there 
are many biological Prussians who nonetheless entertained anti-Prussian, English ideals (such as 
one of WKHSDPSKOHW¶VERJH\Pen, the *HUPDQOLEHUDO³0LFKHO´(p. 8). 
Nonetheless, there is one passage in the pamphlet where Spengler talks of race as 
expressing itself in certain ³ERGLO\ WUDLWV´ (p. 29). Presumably this relates to the way which 
people walk, their facial expressions and so on. With the benefit of the doubt, perhaps this talk of 
ERGLO\ IHDWXUHV LV QRW D PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI 6SHQJOHU¶V ELRORJLFDO GHWHUPLQLVP EXW DQDORJRXV WR
what, following Pierre Bourdieu, modern sociology deems hexus18 ± the way in which habitual 
and typical conditions, particularly in the way individuals move, eat, talk and comport 
themselves express both individual choices and social norms or values.   
Spengler then proceeds to what is by far the longest section of the pamphlet, ³Prussians 
DQG(QJOLVKPHQ´Given the importance Spengler attributes to the conflict between these peoples, 
³3UXVVLDQVDQG(QJOLVKPHQ´ might have perhaps been a better title for the pamphlet as a whole, 
insofar as this title more accurately reflects what, for Spengler, was really at stake politically. For 
Spengler argues that World War I is but one manifestation of a historically rooted Anglo-German 
antagonism, a struggle between the two great Germanic peoples. Such antipathy will invariably 
lead to more fierce struggles between the modern English people, born in the seventeenth 
century, and the Prussian people, born in the eighteenth. The inevitability of such a conflict, and 
the impossibility of mediation or reconciliation between these peoples, is rooted in what 
6SHQJOHU IROORZLQJ1LHW]VFKH GHHPVPRGHUQPDQ¶V LUUHSUHVVLEOHwill to power. This force is 
                                                          
18
 Cf. Richard Jenkings, Pierre Bourdieu (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 74-84. 
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embodied in modern imperialism, first ushered in by seventeenth-century Spain, which aims to 
conquer the entire planet: ³DOOPXVW submit to our political, social, and economic ideal, or perish´
(p. 24). 7KH UHVSHFWLYH ³soul´ RI WKHVH SHRSOHV GHULYHV IURP the fact that the former were 
³knightly´SHRSOHV DQG WKH ODWWHU³Vikings´ (p. 61) ± the Prussians feeling the great Germanic 
idea above them (the commitment to the community) and the English within them (a 
commitment to individual independence (p. 31)). This clash is therefore one between an English 
community of happiness and a Prussian community of duty; money versus rank; job versus 
RFFXSDWLRQ IUHH WUDGHYHUVXVDXWDUN\³the gentleman¶VJDUE´YHUVXV the ³uQLIRUP´SDUW
versus literature. ³(YHU\PDn for himself: that is English. Every man for every other man: that is 
Prussian´ (ibid.). 
In the short section on Marx that follows, Spengler FRQWHQGV WKDW 0DU[¶V WKRXJKW
conflates the struggle between these great peoples with the struggle between social classes. 
0DU[¶VDSSURDFKLV³purely English´S. Since Marx is unaware of the true antagonism of 
the epoch, he unconsciously takes as his point of departure the principles and concepts of English 
political economy in order to subject it to a critique. Spengler views this critique as a ³splendid 
construction´ S  but maintains that it is ignorant of the different cultural souls and 
dispositions of the various peoples. In Prussia, as opposed to England, for example, social 
position is informed not by wealth but by social rank. Following English political economy, 
Marx treats labour like any other commodity. However, this is at odds with the Prussian 
mentality, according to which work is not a mere object to be bought and sold, but a calling, as 
expressed in the German word Beruf. 
,WLVIRUWKLVUHDVRQWKDW6SHQJOHUDFFXVHV0DU[RIEHLQJ³a good materialist and a poor 
SV\FKRORJLVW´ (p. 69). For Spengler, 0DU[¶V WKHRU\ is English political economy turned on its 
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head ± ³WKH FDSLWDOLVP RI WKH ORZHU FODVV´ (p. 47) informed by a Viking-style envy of the 
propertied classes and their wealth, a system in which ³FODVVHJRLVPLVHOHYDWHGWRDSULQFLSOH´ 
(p. 75). The working-class stULNH ZDV ³the classical feature´ RI 0DU[¶V (English) ³trader 
philosophy´S 
The pamphlet concludes with a section entitled ³The International´, which highlights the 
illusion of a peaceful world order, as heralded by the outbreak of World War I. Spengler argues 
that further military conflicts are a given and sketches out a world in which it is inevitable that 
the entire world will be economically coordinated and administered. Yet will this world be run 
E\6SHQJOHU¶VGHGLFDWHGVHOI-sacrificing, dutiful Prussian soldiers and bureaucrats or by ruthless, 
self-interested, exploitative English bankers and traders? These questions conclude the pamphlet, 
along with the warning that further military conflicts are on the immediate horizon: ³a genuine 
InternDWLRQDOLVRQO\SRVVLEOHWKURXJKWKHYLFWRU\RIWKHLGHDRIRQHUDFHRYHUDOORWKHUV´ (p. 84). 
 
Socialist Morphology 
/HWXVQRZORFDWH6SHQJOHU¶VYLHZVZLWKLQKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQWThe thesis 
XQGHUSLQQLQJ6SHQJOHU¶V$QJOR-German antagonism is his morphological conception of history. 
This conception is central to Decline of the West, but is also a guiding thread in Prussianism and 
Socialism: unlike other varieties of socialism, which are often based on an understanding of 
economic GHYHORSPHQWRU HWKLFDO LPSHUDWLYHV6SHQJOHU¶V VRFLDOLVP LVPHWDSK\VLFDOO\EDVHG Ln 
this overview of human history. 
For Spengler, there are eight JUHDWRUKLJK³cultures´LQWKHFRXUVHRIKXPDQVRFLHW\, the 
last of which is Faustian or Western society.19 These cultures develop independently from each 
other organically and are subject to the laws of organic matter in general: each culture will come 
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 The following overview is based on Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die konservative Revolution, pp. 104-7. 
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into existence, blossom, decay and ultimately perish. In order to enunciate the cyclical, repetitive 
nature of this organic process, Spengler likens each stage of development to the four seasons 
with quintessential, distinctive characteristics: spring, defined by rural contemplation and 
reflection as opposed to urban action; summer, defined by scholarly output and philosophy; 
autumn, defined E\WKHGLVLQWHJUDWLRQRIWKHFXOWXUHRU³race´DQGWKHHPHUJHQFHRIVDWLUHDQG
scepticism; and winter, characterised by urbanism, mass poverty, politics and entertainment, 
epitomised by the historical figure of Caesar, whose modern incarnation, argues Spengler, lies in 
the future (Spengler was tempted to see Benito Mussolini as such a figure, but on occasion Adolf 
Hitler too).  
Spengler thus views in history the existence of something along the lines of the 
sychronicity of the non-synchronous [die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen], not in Ernst 
%ORFK¶V VHQVH RI VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ H[LVWLQJ DJHV LGHDOV DQG RXWORRNV LQ RQH HSRFK EXW DV WZR
historical facts which, existing in completely different cultures or times, appear in exactly the 
same ± relative ± situation. In Spenglerian terms, Archimedes and Carl Friedrich Gauss, 
Polygnotus and Rembrandt, as well as Alexander the Great and Napoleon, are contemporaries, or 
homologous historical phenomena. The latter two figures ushered in the winter period of Ancient 
and Faustian FXOWXUHUHVSHFWLYHO\RUDV6SHQJOHUSXWVLWWKHVHFXOWXUHV¶WUDQVLWLRQIURPKultur to 
Zivilisation.  
For Spengler, 1914 marked the arrival of the winter of Western civilisation, with all that 
this entailed in terms of modern-day Caesarism (which we shall discuss below), mass urban 
existence and military conflict. With the dawning of civilisation, countries like France, Spain and 
Italy ± once bearers of a culture associated with spirit, conviviality and taste ± had descended 
into insignificance, with England and Germany appearing centre stage. 
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The creation of an antagonism between English and German culture was no invention of 
SpenJOHU¶V EXW LQ WKHPRXOG RI WKH LGHRORJLFDOPRELOLVDWLRQ RI WKH*HUPDQ people during the 
war, and the attempts on the part of philosophers such as Rudolf Eucken and Paul Natorp to 
create what Hermann Lübbe calls a ³PHWDSK\VLFVRI*HUPDQQHVV´20. This attempt to formulate 
philosophically a unique German identity distinct from the other warring nations was also a 
guiding principle of the Conservative Revolution. Ernst Troeltsch, Johann Plenge and Werner 
Sombart were pioneering in this regard, with the latter publishing a 1915 treatise under the 
revealing title Traders and Heroes (Händler und Helden, the latter, of course, being the 
Germans).21 Troeltsch also distinguished, as does Spengler, between the individualism of the 
English gentlemen, French ideas of equality and German ideas of self-denying community. 
Plenge likewise viewed liberal traditions as a foreign infiltration [Überfremdung] of the German 
spirit.22 What distinguishes Spengler from these thinkers (Troeltsch, Sombart, Plenge and 
Natorp), however, is his integration of these metaphysical justifications of Germanness, via the 
concepts of civilisation and culture, into his overall cyclical view of history. 
6SHQJOHU¶V GHSOR\PHQW RI WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ culture and civilisation was another 
trope in the competing political discourse on both sides of the trenches in World War I. Whereas 
French and British pro-ZDU LQWHOOHFWXDOV FODLPHG WR EH ILJKWLQJ IRU ³FLYLOLVDWLRQ´ WKRVH LQ
*HUPDQ\LQVFULEHGRQWKHLUEDQQHUVWKHVORJDQRI³FXOWXUH´23 For the Marxist philosopher Georg 
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 Hermann Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland (Munich: dtv, 1974), p. 185. The intellectual role model 
in this respect was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, whose Speeches to the German Nation during the German Wars of 
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 -DPHV+DZHV¶V UHFHQWERRNEnglanders and Huns outlines the development of this Anglo-German antagonism 
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and Huns: How Five Decades of Enmity Led to the First World War (London: Simon and Schuster, 2014). 
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 Quoted in Falck (ed.), Zyklen und Cäsaren, p. 79. 
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accentuate this antagonism (Lübbe, Politische Philosophie, p. 214). In philosophical terms, Lübbe (ibid., p. 191) 
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LukáFV³FXOWXUH´KDGEHHQDleitmotif LQ³UHDFWLRQDU\*HUPDQ\SKLORVRSK\´IRUVRPHWLPHZLWK
the ideological struggle against the democratisation of Germany taking place ³XQGHUWKHbanner 
of this antagonism, in which µFLYLOLVDWLRQ¶LVSRUWUD\HGDVHYHU\WKLQJWKDWLVEDGXQGHUFDSLWDOLVP
particularly Western democracy, opposed to which stands the autochthonous, organic, genuinely 
*HUPDQ µFXOWXUH¶´.24 6SHQJOHU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI culture is in line with his conception of 
socialism-as-form-of existence, a part of his overall cyclical historical model: his socialism is, to 
Faustian man, what Stoicism was to the Ancients or what Buddhism was to the Indic culture.25  
Yet is this understanding of the development of Prussian socialism not out of step with 
our earlier contention that Spengler was a political thinker who placed emphasis on human 
agency and the need for an active struggle against English ideas? Indeed, if socialism is in some 
way predetermined, why would he produce a pamphlet to try and alter the course of events?  
 
Necessary and Fatal(ist) 
The extent to which human actors are free to intervene in, shape or even undermine this 
progression of cycles has been a source of controversy in the rHFHSWLRQRI6SHQJOHU¶V WKRXJKW 
One British reviewer of Decline of the West IRU LQVWDQFHGHVFULEHG6SHQJOHU¶V VRFLDOLVPDV D
³QHFHVVDU\ DQG IDWDO V\PSWRPRIRXUFLYLOLVDWLRQ´, implying that, for Spengler, socialism is an 
inevitable, pre-determined social formation.26 Martin Falck, by contrast, argues that while for 
Spengler the outlines of the overall fate of Western history had been sketched out, the German 
people in particular faced concrete choices as to what the final outcome of history would exactly 
look like.27 Even though Falck adds the caveat that many RI WKRVH LQIOXHQFHG E\ 6SHQJOHU¶V
                                                          
24
 Georg Lukács, Die Zerstörung der Vernunft (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1954), p. 375.  
25
 Falck (ed.), Zyklen und Cäsaren, p. 80. 
26
 Cf. Zaur Gasimov and Carl Antonius Lemke Duque (eds.), Oswald Spengler als europäisches Phänomen, p. 160. 
27
 Martin Falck (ed.), Zyklen und Cäsaren, p. 74.  
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Decline of the West FRQVFLRXVO\LJQRUHGRUUHMHFWHG6SHQJOHU¶VWKHRU\RIKLVWRU\DOWRJHWKHU,28 his 
appreciation of the relation between determinism and agency in Prussianism and Socialism is 
well-founded. After all, Prussianism and Socialism is clear that Western man is faced with a 
number of political alternatives within the context of civilisation. Paraphrasing the famous 
GLFWXPRIRQHRIWKHSDPSKOHW¶VSROHPLFDOWDUJHWV.DUO0DU[29 one might say that, for Spengler, 
men do not quite make their own history, but are nonetheless faced with several choices and 
ways of organising their lives against the backdrop of highly restrictive, pinched and prescribed 
circumstances which are certainly not of their own choosing. 
6SHQJOHU¶VSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQVRFLHWLHVDQG human organisms can help explain the choices 
that he believes are open to Faustian man. An elderly man is unlikely to be able to run a 
marathon and will probably die if he simply sets off one morning. On the other hand, he might be 
able to go on regular walks or even jogs, and in so doing may actually prolong his life and make 
it more comfortable. Yet this presupposes at least recognising that he is an old man and that his 
exercise options are thus limited. Analogously, for Prussianism and Socialism, Germany did 
have the possibility of becoming a healthy and stable hegemonic world power. Yet this required 
insight into the nature of Realpolitik and harsh political facts, an insight which is the direct 
opposite of romanticism, idealism and theory.  
The youth in particular are urged to take up this challenge of leading Germany forward. 
Spengler suEVHTXHQWO\H[SODLQHGWKDWIRUKLP³the young generation´ZDVFRQVLGHUHGVXFK³not 
LQ\HDUV´ EXWLQ³power of judgement´DQG³responsibility´WKRVHZKRKDYHQHLWKHUZLOODOZD\V
be far too young for politics, he adds.30 How, then, does Spengler understand the political 
                                                          
28
 Ibid., p. 88. 
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 .DUO0DU[µ'HUDFKW]HKQWH%UXPDLUHGHV/RXLV%RQDSDUWH¶LQ.DUO0DU[DQG)ULHGULFK(QJHOVWerke, Volume 
8, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972) 
30
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choices open to humanity in the winter of civilisation? What is possible and what is not? Let us 
now move to discuss 6SHQJOHU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ of democracy and dictatorship in Prussianism 
and Socialism. 
 
Kaiser Bebel  
2QHGHILQLQJ IHDWXUH RI 6SHQJOHU¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RIZLQWHU LV WKH LGHD WKDW )DXVWLDQPDQZLOO
face the prospect of Caesarism, a form of dictatorship that is homologous to the one to be found 
in the late Roman Empire. In order to make this case, the pamphlet develops a critique of 
representative democracy in general and liberal parliamentary democracy in particular, arguing 
that in the winter of Western civilisation both become a mere façade for the rule of entrenched 
plutocratic interests, which direct events from behind the scenes: ³WKHUHODWLRQVKLSbetween party 
leaders and party, between party and masses, will be tougher, more transparent and more brazen´ 
(p. 67). One way in which this tendency towards dictatorship manifests itself is the mass political 
press. For all its democratic pretensions, the modern press paves the way for future dictators: 
³VWLOOWRGD\\RXFDQILQGPRURQVKHUHDQGWKHUHZKRDUHHQWKXVHGE\WKHLGHDRIWKHIUHHGRPRI
the press, but precisely through this freedom the coming Caesars of the world press have a free 
KDQG´.31 
Spengler argues that Caesarism is an unavoidable feature of modern political life. But this 
dictatorship can either be benign or malignant: the outcome will depend on the concrete choices 
of the German people. Will this Caesarist dictatorship be a ³dictatorship of money or of 
organisation, the world as booty or as a state, wealth or authority, success or calling [Beruf@´" (p. 
65). 
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 6SHQJOHU¶VDQWL-Weimar politics come to the fore here, with republicanism in particular 
earning his scorn: ³LWLVSUHFLVHO\WKHUHSXEOLFDQIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQWWKDWKDVQRWKLQJWRGRwith 
VRFLDOLVP´ (p. 13). His target appears to be Marxist social democracy, which was convinced that 
± WKURXJKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIWKHPDVVHVDQGWKURXJKDFFRXQWDELOLW\ZRUNHUV¶ZDJHVIRUSROLWLFDO
representatives and so on ± it could undermine the corrupting influence of wealth on party 
politics and transform democracy. Whereas the Marxist left, following Friedrich Engels, 
envisaged the democratic republic as the form of working-class rule,32 Spengler and his right-
wing contemporaries viewed republicanism an alien political form that was the epitome of social 
and cultural decline and thus a cornerstone of civilisation. 
  How does Spengler try and make the case for his anti-republican alternative, a socialist 
monarchy? FROORZLQJ5REHUW0LFKHOV¶VZRUNRQWKHiron law of oligarchy, which propounds that 
in modern political life mass organisations such as the SPD have an inbuilt tendency towards 
moving away from democracy and embracing some of the oligarchical features Spengler 
discerns in Caesarism,33 Prussianism and Socialism portrays the SPD, and its most important 
leader, August Bebel, as a genuinely Prussian, authoritarian institution that was in fact run in a 
Caesarist fashion. Bebel in particular comes in for much praise: had he not died in 1913, then he 
would have had no hesitation at all in re-DIILUPLQJ WKH SDUW\¶V WUXH3UXVVLDQ VSLULW RI WKH civil 
peace of 4 August 1914 and ushering in a dictatorship that would violently impose its will on 
society. In a critique of the November Revolution that occasionally borders on the voluntaristic, 
Spengler is convinced that, under the Prussian Bebel, heads would have rolled under the rule of 
KLV³iron hand´S$IWHUDOOKHDVNVZDVLt not Bismarck who had created Prussian socialism 
                                                          
32
 Cf. Friedrich Engels, µ=XU.ULWLNGHVVR]LDOGHPRNUDWLVFKHQ3URJUDPPHQWZXUIHV¶LQKarl Marx/Friedrich Engels, 
Werke, Vol. 22 (Dietz: Berlin, 1972), p. 235. 
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through worker-protection laws? And was the SPD not organised rather like a military machine 
under Bebel? 
This particular view of SPD history and Bebel, who was popularly known as the Shadow 
Kaiser,34 a fierce opponent of the monarchy and somebody always at pains to avoid conflict with 
(QJODQGLVGHHSO\SUREOHPDWLF<HWLWLVHYLGHQFHERWKRI6SHQJOHU¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOJ\PQDVWLFVDQG
his knowledge of the SPD and its history. His narrative about the purportedly authoritarian SPD 
and Bebel also allows him to spin the political behaviour of the SPD during the November 
Revolution as a stab in the back from the invisible English forces within the country, as a case of 
³insubordination in the workers¶ SDUW\ DQG VLPXOWaneously in the armed forces´ (p. 46). The 
63'¶V 3UXVVLDQ ZLOO WR SRZHU XQGHU %HEHO KDG EHFRPH anglicised, degenerating from a 
philosophy of power into an obsession with penny-pinching, drab trade-union struggles.  
 6SHQJOHU¶V FULWLTXH aims to show how things could have been, and still could be, very 
GLIIHUHQW7KLV LV QRW WKH HQGRI6SHQJOHU¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI*HUPDQ VRFLDO GHPRFUDF\ KRZHYHU
There are a number of other references to socialist thinkers, to which we shall now turn in order 
to understand how his socialism differed from other thinkers of the Conservative Revolution who 
likewise championed a form of socialism.  
 
Lassalle and Lensch 
In order to boost his Prussian-VRFLDOLVW FUHGHQWLDOV 6SHQJOHU FLWHV )HUGLQDQG /DVVDOOH¶V 
What Next? as an inspiration for an alliance between the German aristocracy and the working 
class, thereby creating further distance between his socialism and that of Marx, who was 
typically forthcoming in his criticisms of the remarkably contradictory Lassalle. Through his 
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strict, dictatorial leadership of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiter Verein (ADAV), Lassalle 
contributed much to breaking the German working class from liberalism and to establishing an 
independent working-class party, as outlined in his famous Open Letter (1863), which made the 
case for the working class forming its own social institutions. Widely read and discussed, this 
open letter is considered to have created the basis of the ADAV. Simultaneously, however, 
Lassalle held a number of convictions which were inimical to the idea of the German working 
class pursuing its own political project, not least his views of the Prussian state and his flirtation 
with a possible alliance with Otto von Bismarck and the German Junker class against the 
bourgeoisie. In this limited sense, Lassalle can certainly be considered an intellectual forefather 
of Spengler. 
)DVFLQDWLQJO\QRWOHDVWZKHQLWFRPHVWR6SHQJOHU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKVRFLDOGHPRFUDF\
Prussianism and Socialism (p. 49) also references Three Years of World Revolution, a 1917 
pamphlet written by the German SPD Reichstag deputy Paul Lensch.35 Once a pupil of Rosa 
Luxemburg and a household name on the radical left wing of the SPD, in 1914 he and his allies 
in the Die Glocke group (The Bell, a publication established in 1915) came to the conclusion that 
World War I actually represented a revolutionary process, in which a German victory could 
EUHDN%ULWDLQ¶VGRPLQDQFHRIWKHZRUOGDQGWKXVRSHQXSDVSDFHIRUJHQXLQHO\0DU[LVW*HUPDQ
SPD-type organisations to develop, as opposed to the Labourite, trade-unionist organisations that 
GRPLQDWHG WKH %ULWLVK ZRUNHUV¶ PRYHPHQW ,QGHHG DV IRU VR PDQ\ GLIIHUHQW WKLQNHUV ZKR
influenced, and were influenced by, the philosophical ideas of 1914, Britain¶V alliance with 
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Tsarism ± the embodiment of political reaction ± made Lensch and his comrades feel vindicated 
in their analysis.36  
Unlike Spengler, Lensch and his co-thinkers remained subjectively committed to the idea 
that they were engaged in further developing the politics of Marxism, but there is a remarkable 
overlap between 6SHQJOHU¶V DQG /HQVFK¶V analysis of the role of England and the English 
ZRUNHUV¶PRYHPHQWZKLFKwere seen as embodying a variety of the English trader philosophy 
in its uninspired syndicalism. By contrast, both Lensch and Spengler saw the German SPD 
(particularly under August Bebel) as an organisation that fought for political power. 
It is striking just how conversant Spengler was with the various competing discourses of 
his time. His understanding of, and engagement with, socialist ideas sets him apart from other 
post-World War I right-wing thinkers such as Paul Natorp and Johann Plenge. Natorp deemed 
World War I ³the day of the Germans´ DQG VLPLODUO\ WR 6SHQJHU ZDV FRQYLQFHG WKDt the 
Germans had socialism in their blood.37 Spengler, however, would have argued that Natorp had 
confused the loudest issue of the day with the most profound: Natorp, after all, was of the 
opinion that 1914 embodied the clash between the two systems of capitalism and socialism, not 
between the two bearers of the great Germanic idea. 
 
Opportunist Socialism? 
IV6SHQJOHU¶VVRFLDOLVPnot typical of the Young Conservative movement and its struggle against 
all notions of a democratically organised society? Indeed, in a 1932 foreword to a reprint of 
Prussianism and Socialism, Spengler downplays any understanding of socialism as an economic 
concept, stressing its metaphysical and spiritual dimension. He even underlines how his 
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socialism would not get rid of the market, as it SUHVXSSRVHV ³a private economy with its old-
*HUPDQLFMR\RISRZHUDQGERRW\´38 $VVXFK6SHQJOHU¶VDQWL-capitalist critique is one that boils 
down to an opposition to finance capital (which he scathingly deems a ³parasitic form of 
SURSHUW\´), 39 not to the logic of capital accumulation in general. 
Theodor W. Adorno VHHVPXFKWKDWLVZRUWK\LQ6SHQJOHU¶VFULWLTXHRIGHPRFUDF\DVDQ
instrument of Caesarist control. Nonetheless, he FDOOV LQWR TXHVWLRQ 6SHQJOHU¶V VRFLDOLVP E\
highlighting the weaknesses in his understanding of political economy, accusing Spengler of 
EHLQJ³helplessly dilettantish´LQWKHVHPDWWHUV40 Indeed, just how a state is to mediate between 
socio-economic interests when it is not directly accountable to the population is a central 
SUREOHP LQ 6SHQJOHU¶V SROLWLFDO HFRQRP\ For the same reason, even Ernst Niekisch, the 
enigmatic National Bolshevik thinker who sought to fuse German nationalism with revolutionary 
left-ZLQJ SROLWLFV ZDV FULWLFDO RI 6SHQJOHU¶V social alternative. He viewed it as ³the old 
authoritarian state [Obrigkeitsstaat@RQFHDJDLQZKLFKWKHZRUNHUKDVWRREH\EOLQGO\´.41 
For Georg Lukács, the core of the project of the thinkers from the German philosophy of 
life tradition since Nietzsche, particularly Spengler, is actually the struggle against socialism.42 
In left-ZLQJFLUFOHVDIWHUDOO6SHQJOHU¶VQDPHEHFDPHDQLQVXOWZLWKWKH0DU[LVW.DUO.DXWVN\
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 Ibid., p. 12. 
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referring to one political opponent, Emil FraQ] DV ³a red 6SHQJOHU´43 Lukács maintains that, 
since the Russian October Revolution of 1917, this ideological struggle on the part of the 
*HUPDQ LPSHULDOLVW ERXUJHRLVLH KDG HQWHUHG D QHZ VWDJHZLWK6SHQJOHU¶V SKLORVRSK\ VKRZLQJ
how strong this turn away from programmes, reason and systematic thought had become. For 
LukáFV 6SHQJOHU¶V PHWKRG DPRXQWs to little more than a degrading of age-old notions 
concerning the law-like emergence, blossoming and decline of cultures ± found amongst thinkers 
as varied as Giambattista Vico and Hegel ± into unfounded historical analogies, another 
manifestation of the destruction of reason, with a decadent ruling class and its ideologues 
plumbing new intellectual depths in the struggle against socialism.44  
In this sense, for all 6SHQJOHU¶V FODLPs of being able to see more clearly than other 
thinkers as a result of his independence from party-political interests,45 Prussianism and 
Socialism may be seen, in the words of one British Fabian socialist reviewer of Spengler, as 
amounting to ³OLWWOHPRUH WKDQHFKR[ing] WKHSUHMXGLFHVRIKLVFODVVDQG WLPH´46 Spengler may 
thus have fallen into the trap of what he explicitly warns against in the introduction to 
Prussianism and Socialism: projecting onto socialism the fears and prejudices of his own 
environment and background. Ernst Stutz is quite correct to highlight the intimate relationship 
EHWZHHQ 6SHQJOHU¶V conception of history and his political views: there is a clear connection 
between 6SHQJOHU¶V prognoses for the Western world and his understanding of Caesarist Rome. 
Nonetheless, 6SHQJOHU¶V eclectic incorporation of an array of socialist, statist and syndicalist 
schools of thought is indicative of a thinker who is engaged in a daring political wager 
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conditioned by his immediate surroundings in early Weimar Germany, where socialist 
organisations and ideas were so dominant that he felt compelled to develop a critique of Marxist 
socialism and thereby steer political events towards his own anti-democratic outlook. As we have 
seen, Prussianism and Socialism is by no means the intervention of an aristocrat who longingly 
harks back to pre-modern Germany from the comfort of his armchair. Nor is it, however, able to 
break with an aristocratic opposition to democracy and mass political life. Accordingly, 
6SHQJOHU¶VPDLQWDUJHW LQPrussianism and Socialism LVZKDWKHGHHPV³thinking from below´, 
the ³apotheosis of herd sentiment´47  
HRZHYHUGLVFUHGLWHG6SHQJOHU¶VPHWKRGRORJ\PD\EHDQGZKHUHYHURQHPD\FXUUHQWO\
place Western civilisation, his FRQFHUQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH³ZLQWHU´ of the West remain part of the 
modern world in which basic democratic forms seem rather precarious, military conflicts are a 
stubborn feature of everyday life, an all-encompassing media machine increasingly sets the 
ideological agenda and the fate of entire countries hinges on developments in the financial 
markets. +XPDQLW\¶VLQDELOLW\WRUHVROYHWKHYHU\VRFLR-political dilemmas Spengler was able to 
pinpoint explains the enduring relevance of his ideas. 
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